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Heads I Win, Tails You Lose:   
The Disparate Treatment of Similarly Situated 
Taxpayers Under the Personal Injury Income Tax 
Exclusion 
Habib E. Hanna 
INTRODUCTION 
Personal injury tort litigation continues to dominate the legal 
landscape in the United States.1  Whether at the hands of a jury verdict, 
court order or a structured settlement agreement, tort litigation leads to the 
exchange of vast amounts of money.2  Subsequently, whenever there is an 
exchange of money between two or more people, the United States Tax 
Code (“Code”) will likely have an impact on all the parties involved.  The 
Code is primarily concerned with taxing income, so it tends to focus on the 
recipient of a tort damages money award.3  The primary Internal Revenue 
Code (“I.R.C.”) provision that deals with money received subsequent to a 
personal injury tort damages award is I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (“section 
104(a)(2)”).4  Since it was enacted in 1918, section 104(a)(2) has generated 
a considerable level of criticism, dismay and confusion over its intent, 
definition, and application.5 
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 1 See generally John T. Nockleby, How to Manufacture a Crisis: Evaluating Empirical Claims 
Behind 'Tort Reform,' 86 OR. L. REV. 533 (2007). 
 2 Id. 
 3 I.R.C. § 61 (West 2009) (“[G]ross  income  means  all  income  from  whatever  source  derived.”).  
Unless   otherwise   noted,   all   references   to   the   “Code”   are   to   the   Internal   Revenue   Code   of   1986,   as  
amended. 
 4 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 2009) stating: 
(a) In general. Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) 
deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior 
taxable year, gross income does not include . . . (2) the amount of any damages (other than 
punitive damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as 
periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness[.] 
 5 See Frank J. Doti, Personal Injury Income Tax Exclusion: An Analysis and Update, 75 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 61,  79  (1997)  (“For  nearly  eighty  years,  taxpayers,  their  advisors,  and  the  government  have  
wrestled   with   the   scope   of   the   personal   injury   exclusion.”).    See also Renee C. Harvey, Note, 
Commissioner v. Schleier: An Unfair Interpretation of Section 104(a)(2), 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 342 
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Congressional intent behind the enactment of section 104(a)(2) 
represents a foundational theme that often dictates the method and manner 
in which section 104(a)(2) is applied.6  Congress designed section 
104(a)(2) with one primary goal in mind: to alleviate the tax burden for 
those who suffered a personal injury and received income as a result of tort 
litigation.7  At its essence, section 104(a)(2) excludes from taxation any 
amount of money damages recovered by a taxpayer “on account of 
personal physical injuries or physical sickness.”8  While this phrase seems 
relatively straightforward, it has proven difficult in real-life application.9  
Two of the primary issues presented by section 104(a)(2) are the definition 
of the word “physical” and the phrase “on account of.”10  A quick example 
will show how section 104(a)(2) works.  A person is injured in a car 
accident, sues for money damages and recovers an award for pain, 
suffering and lost wages.  Because this taxpayer received money on 
account of a personal physical injury, that amount is fully excludable and 
the taxpayer owes no income tax on the amount recovered. 
One of the main problems encountered under section 104(a)(2) 
involves a tort that causes purely emotional distress that later manifests into 
a physical injury.11  Any damages received in such a scenario are not 
excluded under section 104(a)(2) because the damages are not received on 
account of the physical injury, rather they are received on account of the 
emotional distress injury.12  This outcome appears to be discriminatory in 
that it treats similarly situated taxpayers—those who suffered physical 
injuries at one point or another—differently.13  This disparate result is due 
to the fact that one physical injury occurred immediately as a result of the 
 
(Fall  1995)  (stating  that  section  104(a)(2)  “has  caused  the  courts,  taxpayers,  and  the  [Internal  Revenue]  
Service  considerable  consternation”  since  its  inception);; Margarita R. Karpov, Note, To Tax or Not To 
Tax — That is the Question in the Midst of Murphy v. I.R.S., 23 AKRON TAX J. 143, 143–44 (2008) 
(“This   code   section   has   seen   differences   of   opinion,   amendments,   and   commentator   mistrust   on  
numerous  occasions”);;  Robert  J.  Henry,  “Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of Personal 
Injury Recoveries,” 23 HOUS. L. REV. 701, 702 n.7 (1986) (stating that section 213(b)(6) of the 
Revenue Act of 1918 was the predecessor to the modern iteration of section 104(a)(2)). 
 6 See Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain — No Gain?  Should Personal Injury Damages Keep Their 
Tax Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 407, 409 (1986–1987) (discussing the intent of 
Congress in relation to section 104(a)(2)). 
 7 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 236 n.6 (1992). 
 8 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 2009). 
 9 See Doti, supra note 5, at 61–62 (referring   to   the   phrase   “on   account   of   personal   physical  
injuries  or  physical   sickness”  and  stating   that  “there still are many uncertainties over the meaning of 
these terms”). 
 10 Benjamin T. Cory, Note, Amos v. Commissioner: The Ambiguous and Ever-Changing 
Definition of What Constitutes a Personal Physical Injury Under Internal Revenue Code Section 
104(A)(2), 66 MONT. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (Winter 2005). 
 11 See Patrick E. Hobbs, The Personal Injury Exclusion: Congress Gets Physical but Leaves the 
Exclusion Emotionally Distressed, 76 NEB. L. REV. 51, 88–89 (1997). 
 12 See id. 
 13 Nicholas M. Whittington, Note, Against the Grain: An Interdisciplinary Examination of the 
1996 Federal Statutory Changes to the Taxability of Personal Injury Awards, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 153, 
185 (Fall 1997)   (concluding   that   the   “physical”   requirement   leads   to   arbitrary   application   of   the   tax  
law). 
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tort while the other physical injury occurred at a later point in time as a 
consequence of the emotional distress that was immediately caused by the 
tort.14  This comment posits that section 104(a)(2) treats similarly situated 
taxpayers inequitably and leads to an application of the tax code that lacks 
uniformity.  Specifically, this comment argues that those who suffer real, 
verifiable physical manifestations of emotional distress injuries should 
receive the same favorable tax treatment received by those who suffer 
purely physical injuries. 
This comment acknowledges and accepts the fact that Congress 
specifically refused to extend the benefits of section 104(a)(2) to those who 
suffer purely emotional distress injuries.15  However, there are legitimate 
cases where taxpayers suffer verifiable physical manifestations of 
emotional distress and those individuals should be afforded the same tax 
treatment as those who suffer purely physical injuries.16  Part I outlines the 
background and evolution of section 104(a)(2).  Part II presents the 
development of section 104(a)(2) by examining the important case 
decisions dealing with the interpretation and application of section 
104(a)(2).  Part III undertakes an exhaustive analysis of the inequity that 
results when section 104(a)(2) is applied to individuals who suffer physical 
manifestations of emotional distress.  Part III also discusses the treatment 
of physical manifestations of emotional distress by medical science and the 
field of tort law.  Part IV suggests a viable course of action that would 
eliminate this disparate treatment while upholding congressional intent.  
Finally, this comment concludes that the totality of the circumstances 
presented leads to the logical deduction that section 104(a)(2) treats 
similarly situated taxpayers in a disparate manner and that the best course 
of action is through the adoption of the recommendations made in Part IV. 
I.  BACKGROUND:  TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
SECTION 104(A)(2) 
Section 61 of the Code states that, “Except as otherwise provided in 
this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source 
 
 14 Id. at 161: 
If there is an original physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages, including 
emotional distress damages, that flow from that injury are treated as if they are on account 
of a physical personal injury or physical sickness.  Recoveries for physical injuries caused 
by emotional distress, not linked to an original physical injury, are not excludable from 
income. 
 15 J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding Personal Injury Awards 
Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 177 (Winter 1997) (explaining that Congress 
specifically stated in I.R.C. § 104  that  “emotional  distress  shall  not  be   treated  as  a  physical injury or 
physical sickness”). 
 16 See Kurt A. Leeper, Note, Arguably Arbitrary: Taxation and the Physical Injury Requirement 
of I.R.C. Section 104(a)(2), 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1039,  1061  (2005)  (“[B]y  requiring  a  showing  of  
‘traditional’  physical  injury, [section 104(a)(2)] fails to protect taxpayers who have suffered a physical 
harm brought about by a nonphysical injury.”). 
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derived . . . .”17  While the word “all” implies an extraordinary level of 
inclusion, there are limited but significant exceptions to the rule.18  Those 
exceptions, however, are often interpreted in a narrow manner such that the 
breadth of section 61 remains extremely broad.19  Section 104(a)(2) 
represents an important exception to section 61 and addresses the exclusion 
of personal injury proceeds received subsequent to civil tort litigation or to 
a negotiated tort settlement agreement.20  Section 104(a)(2) states that 
“gross income does not include . . . the amount of any damages (other than 
punitive damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as 
lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical 
injuries or physical sickness.”21 
Prior to 1996, section 104(a)(2) did not include the word “physical” in 
its language and referred only to an exclusion of income received on 
account of personal injuries or sickness.22  However, in 1996 Congress 
amended section 104(a)(2) and added the word “physical” to the statutory 
language.23  This amendment resulted from the original statute’s vague 
congressional intent to prevent the recipients of money damages awards 
from using section 104(a)(2) if the award resulted from a physical 
manifestation of an emotional distress injury.24  This seemingly minor 
change to section 104(a)(2) led to increased levels of apprehension among 
legal professionals and academics who were already critical of the pre-
amendment version for its ambiguous language.25  In addition, the courts 
have struggled26 and wavered27 in their attempts to find a bright line of 
separation between what is obviously physical, what may be partly physical 
and partly emotional, and what may be purely emotional.28  There are two 
 
 17 I.R.C. § 61 (West 2009). 
 18 Karpov, supra note 5, at 146. 
 19 See id. at 146–47; see also Comm’r   v.   Schleier,   515  U.S.   323,   327   (1995)   (stating   that   the  
Court  has  “repeatedly  emphasized  the  sweeping  scope”  of  I.R.C.  § 61 (internal quotations omitted)). 
 20 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 328–29. 
 21 I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (West 2009). 
 22 O’Gilvie   v.  United  States,   519  U.S.   79,   85   (1996)   (citing   the  Revenue  Act  of   1918,  Ch.  18  
§ 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066 as the predecessor to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)). 
 23 Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1209 (2008). 
 24 Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis of Murphy v. 
Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REV. 185, 200–01 (2007). 
 25 See generally Tamara Larre, Pity the Taxpayer: The Tax Exemption for Personal Injury 
Damages as Disability Policy, 33 QUEEN’S L.J. 217, 220–21 (2007).  See also Cory, supra note 10, at 
261  (“By  inserting  the  word ‘physical’ into § 104(a)(2) Congress created an arbitrary and ambiguous 
standard.”). 
 26 Robert W. Wood, Waiting to Exhale: Murphy Part Deux and Taxing Damage Awards, SN059 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 717, 719–20 (Feb. 2008). 
 27 Compare Murphy v. I.R.S., 460 F.3d 79 (D.C.  Cir.  2006)  (“Murphy I”)  (holding  that  I.R.C.  § 
104(a)(2) violated the Sixteenth Amendment because it permitted the taxation of emotional damages 
awards   which   do   not   fall   within   the   definition   of   “incomes”   found   in   the   text   of   the   Sixteenth  
Amendment), with Murphy  v.  I.R.S.,  493  F.3d  170  (2007)  (“Murphy II”)  (reversing  Murphy I based on 
the proposition that purely emotional damages and any physical injuries resulting thereafter are not 
within the definition of physical injuries as intended by Congress when it enacted the 1996 amendment 
to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)).  For an in-depth discussion of Murphy I and II, see infra Part III.E–F. 
 28 See generally Karpov, supra note 5. 
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lines of debate surrounding this issue.  First, what are the exact parameters 
of the word physical.29  Second, how does the nexus between physical and 
emotional injuries impact the excludability of income under section 
104(a)(2).30 
The 1996 amendment to section 104(a)(2) had a disparate impact on 
the applicability of the exclusion.31  The amendment provided comfort for 
those who suffered obvious physical injuries but it also appeared to apply 
in a seemingly inequitable manner based primarily on the fact that those 
who suffer legitimate physical manifestations of emotional distress are 
forced to pay tax on every penny they receive in money damages.32  This 
disparate treatment led many to make the argument that the first Murphy 
court was correct in its assessment that the 1996 amendment was not 
uniformly applied and thus constituted a violation of the Sixteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.33 
In addition, there was another aspect of the 1996 amendment to 
section 104(a)(2) that added even more fuel to the fire of the criticism 
surrounding the amended language: this involved the phrase “on account 
of” in section 104(a)(2).34  Courts have interpreted this phrase to mean that 
any damages award that flows directly from an initial physical injury will 
be covered by section 104(a)(2) and thus will be deemed non-taxable to the 
recipient.35  The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that even purely 
emotional injuries that emanated from physical injuries were covered by 
 
 29 See Wood, Waiting to Exhale, supra note 26, at 723–24 (inquiring about  “what   is  and  is  not  
physical”). 
 30 Germain, supra note 24, at 202–03. 
 31 Doti, supra note 5, at 62. 
 32 See Infanti, supra note 23, at 1209: 
In the service of bias, Congress has enacted a version of 104(a)(2) that will result in the 
dissimilar treatment of similarly situated persons, a violation of the widely accepted 
doctrine of horizontal equity in tax policy analysis.  Injured individuals are not treated 
similarly.  Those who are physically harmed may recover all damages awards tax-free.  
Those injured by employment bias [or other non-physical injuries] may recover nothing tax 
free. 
See also Karpov, supra note 5, at 151; Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third 
Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 708–10 (2007) (arguing that inequitable 
treatment under 104(a)(2) may lead people to fabricate physical injuries to avoid paying taxes.  This 
could lead to enforceability and verifiability issues for the I.R.S. and, ultimately, to   “higher   taxes  or  
reduced  spending”  by  the  federal government). 
 33 See Wood, Waiting to Exhale, supra note 26, at 720, 724–25 (stating  that  “most  people  read  
Judge   Ginsburg’s   first   Murphy opinion as a statement that the 1996 amendments to section 104 
(imposing  the  “physical”  requirements)  were  invalid.”     Wood  goes  on  to  describe  how  the  Murphy II 
court  did  an  “about-face”   to  avoid  the  constitutional  question  when  it   reversed   its  previous  Murphy I 
decision). 
 34 See Germain, supra note 24, at 197. 
 35 O’Gilvie  v.  United  States,  519 U.S. 79, 84 (1996) (stating  that  “pain and suffering damages, 
medical expenses, and lost wages . . . are covered by the statute and hence excluded from income not 
simply because the taxpayer received a tort settlement, but rather because each element . . . satisfies the 
requirement . . . that the damages were received on account of personal injuries or sickness”   (quoting  
Comm’r  v.  Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 330 (1995)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
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the exclusion.36  However, to the dismay of some critics of the 1996 
amendment to section 104(a)(2), the exclusion did not apply in the 
converse situation.37  That is to say, if someone suffered latent physical 
injuries that manifested themselves as a result of a purely emotional injury, 
then that person is not covered by the exclusion and is subject to taxation 
on any and all money damages received for either the emotional or the 
physical manifestations of those emotional injuries.38 
In addition to the criticism of the way section 104(a)(2) treated people 
who suffered purely emotional injuries or physical manifestations of purely 
emotional injuries there is another central concern regarding the 
applicability of the language added in the 1996 Amendments.  This concern 
has to do with the definition of the word “physical” and the extent to which 
any non-visible physical injuries would be covered by the exclusion.39  The 
Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) has not specifically addressed the issue. 
However, the I.R.S. has made one notable statement regarding the 
definition of “physical.”40  In October 2007, the I.R.S. issued a Private 
Letter Ruling in which it stated that a physical injury had to involve 
touching that causes a bruise, cut, swelling or bleeding in order to qualify 
for exclusion under section 104(a)(2).41  This language projects the self-
interested nature of the I.R.S.’s position on the matter, a position that 
naturally lends itself to interpreting the breadth of section 104(a)(2) as 
narrowly as possible.42 
However, the congressional intent behind the 1996 amendment to 
section 104(a)(2) tends to show that the legislators who penned the 
amendment may have envisioned a broader scope for the word 
“physical.”43  The problem with defining the word “physical” as narrowly 
as the I.R.S. has in its Private Letter Ruling is that purely internal injuries 
 
 36 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 329. 
 37 See Germain, supra note 24, at 200–06. 
 38 See Robert W. Wood, Tax Treatment of Settlements and Judgments, SN059 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 665, 
669–70 (Feb. 2008) (asking   the  question   “[w]hat   if   the  defendant’s   conduct  did  not   involve  physical  
touching, but did produce physical injury, particularly physical injury caused by intentional infliction of 
emotional  distress?”  and  cautioning  that   the   I.R.S.’s  emphasis  on  physical   touching  places  an  “undue  
emphasis  on  the  original  harm”  without   taking  into  account   the   real  possibility   that  purely  emotional  
distress can lead to what may be classified as verifiable physical manifestation).  See also Germain, 
supra note 24,  at  204  (arguing  that  the  “clear  purpose  of  the  new  physical  injury  or  physical  sickness  
requirement was to make all amounts received for emotional distress damages, including amounts 
received on account of physical manifestations arising out of that emotional distress, includible in 
income”). 
 39 See Doti, supra note 5, at 75. 
 40 See Karpov, supra note 5, at 172 (stating that “[e]ven   ten   years   after   the   1996   amendment  
changes,   many   questions   remain   in   the   interpretation   of   ‘physical’   in   § 104(a)(2)”   and   arguing   that  
section  104(a)(2)  “has  not  been  applied  consistently”  by  the  courts  or  the  I.R.S.). 
 41 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (July 17, 2000). 
 42 See Wood, Tax Treatment of Settlements, supra note 38, at 672 (criticizing I.R.S. Private Letter 
Ruling  200041022  by  stating  that  “[a]  distinction  between  a  case  in  which  the  plaintiff is touched and 
then injured as a result, compared with the plaintiff who is not touched but injured in the same way, 
seems artificial”). 
 43 See Doti, supra note 5, at 73–74. 
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and pain are apparently not physical enough to qualify.44  Critics of the 
narrow I.R.S. interpretation have posited that the approach is too simplistic 
in that it relies on obvious, visible signs of injury and disregards the very 
real possibility that personal injury litigants could suffer from physical 
injuries that do not necessarily manifest themselves in such visible ways.45 
So, who suffers as a result of the addition of the word “physical” in 
the 1996 amendment to section 104(a)(2)?  Primarily those who are victims 
of purely emotional distress injuries and those who are victims of 
emotional distress injuries that lead to a manifestation of subsequent 
physical injuries.46  Examples include victims of sexual harassment, 
wrongful termination, employment discrimination, unlawful arrest, 
wrongful incarceration, and sexual molestation, just to name a few.47  
These emotional distress victims often have a serious medically and 
psychologically documented impact on their physical and mental well-
being.48 
Unfortunately, the applicability of section 104(a)(2) forces these 
emotional distress victims to pay taxes on any amount of damages they 
recover while someone who suffers a minor injury that bruises for a couple 
of days and then goes away is treated with proverbial “kid gloves” and 
escapes all or most of the tax liability associated with that injury.49  While 
the background of section 104(a)(2) highlights its ambiguities and 
shortcomings, the next section considers various cases that illustrate how 
the courts have struggled to define workable parameters for the application 
of section 104(a)(2). 
 
 44 See Wood, Tax Treatment of Settlements, supra note 38, at 671.  Wood states that he is not sure 
the I.R.S. got it right in Letter Ruling 200041022 when they tried to:  
draw a line between the various incidents of sexual harassment and touching that left no 
‘observable  bodily  harm,’  and  the  various  assaults  (that  they  term  beginning  with  the  ‘First  
Pain  Incident’).  Although  the  [ruling]  seems  cogent  enough,  the  truth  is  that  very  often  it  is  
difficult to separate exactly what causes trauma (and what [type] of trauma) and what does 
not. 
 45 See id.  See also Marianna G. Dyson, Hot Topics in Fringe Benefits, SG003 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 9 
(2001) (arguing that the narrow interpretation made by the Internal Revenue Service in Private Letter 
Ruling 200041022  is  unworkable  as  a  practical  matter  because  “there can be [an] adverse impact on the 
physical being of an individual, whether or not physical symptoms are manifested”). 
 46 See Infanti, supra note 23, at 1209   (“[T]he physical/non-physical dichotomy adopted in 
amended section 104(a)(2) guarantees disparate and disadvantageous treatment of recoveries for the 
physical and emotional harms to workers in job bias cases.”). 
 47 See Stephen Cohen, Why Civil Rights Lawyers Should Study Tax, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 
1,  2  (2006)  (“It seems arbitrary and unfair, for example, that damages for sexual harassment are taxed if 
damages for a broken leg are tax-exempt.”). 
 48 See infra Part III.B. 
 49 See Cory, supra note 10, at 258 (discussing the fact that the petitioner in Amos v. 
Commissioner suffered  what  was   labeled   a  minor   injury   at   best   and   that   “[d]espite   the   fact   that  Mr.  
Amos had no observable injury . . . the Tax Court concluded that Mr. Amos had suffered a physical 
injury”). 
Do Not Delete 2/17/2010 3:06 PM 
168 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:161 
II.  CASE HISTORY:  KEY DECISIONS ILLUSTRATE THE JUDICIARY’S 
ATTEMPTS TO SET THE BOUNDARIES OF I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) 
There are only three Supreme Court decisions dealing directly with 
section 104(a)(2).50  However, there are also numerous federal and tax 
court cases dealing with the interpretation of section 104(a)(2).51  Most of 
these decisions, with the exception of one important outlier,52 demonstrate 
the growing trend that the courts should defer to Congress and the I.R.S. in 
matters requiring statutory interpretation of the Code and federal tax 
legislation.53 
A. United States v. Burke 
One of the first Supreme Court cases dealing with section 104(a)(2) 
was United States v. Burke decided in 1992.54  In Burke, the Court looked 
at the taxability of a money damages award received for violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.55  The taxpayer believed that the back 
pay portion of the settlement—received for a sex discrimination claim 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—was not taxable because it 
was received on account of a personal injury.56  The Court, however, held 
that the award was not excludable under section 104(a)(2) because there 
was no tort-like personal injury redressed by the suit.57 
The Court came to this conclusion based on the reasoning that the 
employees were awarded damages in the form of back pay which did not 
fall within the rubric of tort-like personal injury envisioned by the original 
drafters of section 104(a)(2).58  More importantly, the Burke Court 
 
 50 See infra Part II.A–C.  Other than the primary cases discussed in this comment, there are a 
handful of other Supreme Court cases that dealt tangentially with I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). 
 51 See infra Part II.D–F. 
 52 See infra Part II.E.  See also cases cited, supra note 27. 
 53 See Myron C. Grauer, Justice O'Connor's Approach to Tax Cases: Could She Have Led the 
Court Toward a More Collaborative Role for the Judiciary in the Development of Tax Law?, 39 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 69, (Spring 2007) (discussing Justice O’Connor’s   influence   over   the   Court’s   deferential  
approach to Congress in tax law matters).  See also T. James Lee, Jr., Section 104(a)(2) After 
Commissioner v. Schleier:  Litigating  the  Excludability  of  Statutory  Damages  ‘Received  on  Account  of  
Personal  Injuries,’ 1996 BYU L. REV. 531,  543  n.86  (1996)  (examining  Justice  O’Connor’s  dissenting  
opinion in Schleier where   “[s]he   asserted   that   even   though   the   interpretive   rulings of the [Internal 
Revenue] Service do not rise to the authoritative level of regulations, the Court must give substantial 
deference to  the  Service's  reasonable  interpretations”) (emphasis added). 
 54 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).  This case was decided before the 1996 
amendments to section 104(a)(2), however, it remains an important decision because it established one 
of the first boundary lines between what is and what is not a personal injury. 
 55 Id. at 230. 
 56 Id. at 229. 
 57 Id. at 241 (“[W]e cannot say that a statute such as Title VII, whose sole remedial focus is the 
award of back wages, redresses a tort-like personal injury within the meaning of § 104(a)(2).”). 
 58 Id. at 234 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1991) and stating that: 
Neither the text nor the legislative history of §104(a)(2) offers any explanation of the term 
personal injuries. Since 1960, however, IRS regulations formally have linked identification 
of a personal injury for purposes of §104(a)(2) to traditional tort principles: The term 
‘damages  received  (whether  by  suit  or  agreement)’  means  an  amount  received   . . . through 
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interpreted section 104(a)(2) as applying to both physical and non-physical 
injuries.59  The Court based this reasoning on the fact that Congress 
amended section 104(a)(2) in 1989 to specifically preclude punitive 
damages from the exclusion, thus implying that both physical and non-
physical injuries should be covered by the exclusion.60  The Burke decision 
set the foundation for the requirement of tort or tort-like damages in a 
section 104(a)(2) analysis.61 
B. Commissioner v. Schleier 
The Court followed Burke with the ground-breaking 1995 decision in 
Commissioner v. Schleier.62  This decision involved money damages 
awarded for back wages and liquidated damages in an age discrimination 
suit filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(“ADEA”).63  In Schleier, the taxpayer—with the Burke decision likely in 
mind—included the amount received for back wages in his federal income 
tax return.64  However, the taxpayer excluded the portion received for 
liquidated damages because he claimed that the liquidated damages were 
received on account of personal injuries under section 104(a)(2).65  Using 
logic similar to that in Burke, the Court declared: “Our consideration of the 
plain language of [I.R.C. §] 104(a), the text of the regulation implementing 
[I.R.C. §] 104(a)(2), and our reasoning in Burke convince us that a 
recovery under the ADEA is not excludable from gross income.”66  
The Schleier Court reasoned “that Congress intended the ADEA’s 
liquidated damages to be punitive in nature; thus, they serve no 
compensatory function and cannot be described as being ‘on account of 
personal injuries.’”67  Schleier is significant because the Court annunciated 
a two-prong test for use in analyzing section 104(a)(2) exclusions.68  The 
test requires that, in order to be excludable under section 104(a)(2), the 
money damages award (i) must be received through prosecution or 
 
prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a 
settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution.  (emphasis added) (some 
internal quotations omitted)). 
 59 Id. at 235–36 n.6. 
 60 Id. (“The  enactment  of   this   limited  amendment  addressing  only  punitive  damages  shows  that  
Congress assumed that other damages (i.e., compensatory) would be excluded in cases of both physical 
and nonphysical injury.”). 
 61 See Leeper, supra note 16, at 1052 (stating that United States v. Burke established   the  “tort-
like”  requirement). 
 62 Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).  Like Burke, the Schleier decision also predated the 
1996   amendments   to   section   104(a)(2)  when  Congress   added   the   “physical”   requirement   to   personal  
injuries.  However, this case remains important and applicable because the two-prong test it established 
continues as the threshold test in applying section 104(a)(2). 
 63 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 324–25. 
 64 Id. at 327. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 323. 
 68 See Harvey, supra note 5, at 341. 
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settlement of an action “based upon tort or tort type rights” and (ii) 
received “on account of personal injuries or sickness.”69  However, in 
adopting the “on account of personal injuries” language, the Court added to 
the confusion surrounding section 104(a)(2) when it failed to provide any 
guidelines as to what constitutes a personal injury or sickness.70 
C. O’Gilvie v. United States 
Following the trend it established in Burke and Schleier, the Court 
placed another boundary line on the section 104(a)(2) exclusion in the 1996 
O’Gilvie decision.71  This case dealt with punitive damages received in a 
wrongful death cause of action based on products liability tort law.72  The 
taxpayer claimed that the punitive damages were excludable under section 
104(a)(2) because the damages award was received on account of a 
personal injury, specifically death.73  The Court disagreed and held that the 
“punitive damages received here were not received ‘on account of’ 
personal injuries; hence the provision does not apply, and the damages are 
taxable.”74 
The O’Gilvie Court’s reasoning mirrored that in Burke and Schleier in 
that it relied heavily on congressional intent, and the I.R.S.’s interpretation 
of section 104(a)(2), in making its decision.75  The O’Gilvie Court first 
conceded that the damages received were indeed based on tort or tort-type 
injuries, thus satisfying the first prong of the Schleier test.76  However, the 
Court agreed with the Government’s position that “such [punitive] damages 
were not ‘received . . . on account of’ the personal injuries, but rather were 
awarded ‘on account of’ a defendant’s reprehensible conduct and the jury’s 
need to punish and to deter it.”77  The Court, in deciding Burke, Schleier, 
and O’Gilvie, limited the reach of section 104(a)(2) but failed to provide a 
clear directive as to what is or is not a personal injury.78  As a result, the 
 
 69 Schleier, 515 U.S. at 337. 
 70 See Harvey, supra note 5, at 341–42 (arguing that the Court erred when it failed to clearly 
define  the  term  “on  account  of  personal  injuries  or  sickness,”  and  when  it  avoided  “the  ambiguity  of  the  
statute, which since its inception has caused the courts, taxpayers, and the [Internal Revenue] Service 
considerable consternation”) (emphasis added). 
 71 O’Gilvie  v.  United  States,  519  U.S.  79  (1996). 
 72 Id. at 79. 
 73 Id. at 81. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. at 86–90.  See also F. Patrick Hubbard, Making People Whole Again: The 
Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Tort Damages for Mental Distress, 49 FLA. L. REV. 725, 742 
(1997) (discussing congressional intent—as well as the O’Gilvie Court’s  view  of  punitive  damages  vis-
à-vis section 104(a)(2)—and   concluding   that   there   is   “no   evidence   that   congressional   generosity   or  
concern for administrative convenience provide a reason for exempting these noncompensatory [i.e. 
punitive]  damages”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 76 O’Gilvie, 519 U.S. at 82. 
 77 Id. at 83. 
 78 See Hobbs, supra note 11, at 53–54.  See also Lee, supra note 53,  at  551  (“Though  the  Court  
provided an appropriate grounding in the plain language of the Code, it failed to provide additional 
guidance as to the scope of the term ‘personal injuries’ for purposes of s[ection] 104(a)(2).”);;  Donald  J.  
Zahn, Personal Injury Exclusion: Is the Slashing of Wrists Necessary?, 13 AKRON TAX J. 129, 148–49 
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perception that emanated from cases dealing with section 104(a)(2) is that a 
tort-based money damages award—received for personal physical and non-
physical injuries—is excludable as long as the damages award was 
compensatory in nature, that is, not for liquidated or punitive damages.79 
D. Amos v. Commissioner 
After Congress amended section 104(a)(2) in 1996 and added the 
“physical” requirement, the courts continued to struggle in setting the 
boundary lines between what is and what is not a personal injury.80  In the 
2003 Amos decision, the United States Tax Court addressed the severity 
required in order for an injury to qualify as “physical” within the meaning 
intended by Congress when it amended section 104(a)(2).81  In Amos, the 
taxpayer claimed that the entire award of damages received for an 
intentional kick to the groin was for physical injuries.82  The I.R.S. argued 
that none of the award should be excludable because the taxpayer’s 
physical injuries were minimal and because the authenticity of the injury 
was questionable.83  The Amos court held that the taxpayer did suffer a 
physical injury as is required by section 104(a)(2).84 
The Amos court reasoned that “it is the nature and character of the 
claim settled, and not its validity, that determines whether the settlement 
payment is excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2).”85  The 
court also found that the defendant’s “dominant reason in paying the 
settlement amount at issue was petitioner’s claimed physical injuries as a 
result of the incident.”86  In coming to its conclusion the court pointed to 
congressional intent behind the 1996 amendment where House members 
indicated that purely emotional distress injuries do not fall within the ambit 
of the amended section 104(a)(2) exclusion.87  While the Amos court 
 
(1997) (discussing the Schleier decision  and  stating  that  “[t]he  Court,  in  effect,  broke  from  traditional  
notions of personal injuries and many years of precedent.  The Court indicated that even though tort 
litigation allows for liquidated damages, personal injuries of a legal character are not sufficient to bring 
the   claim   within   the   regulation.”    Zahn goes on to discuss the negative impact of the three major 
Supreme Court decisions on section 104(a)(2)—Burke, Schleier and O’Gilvie—and  concludes  that  “[a]s  
[federal trial and tax] courts diverted their focus from legal precedent to flights of fancy, the state of the 
personal injury award exclusion deteriorated”) (emphasis added). 
 79 See Cory, supra note 10,   at   251   (“Relying   on   a   broad  definition   of   ‘personal   injury,’  many  
rulings  and  court  decisions  during  the  1970’s  and  1980’s  allowed  exclusion  for  damages  arising  from  
both physical and non-physical personal injuries.”). 
 80 See Burke & Friel, supra note 15,  at  168  (“[T]he remedy chosen to limit an overbroad statute, 
the drawing of a line between physical and nonphysical injuries, has introduced its own difficulties and 
is not supportable from a tax policy standpoint.”).    See also Doti, supra note 5,   at   62   (“Most of the 
confusion and controversy surrounding the personal injury exclusion would have been avoided if 
Congress had carefully considered the scope of the exclusion from its inception.”). 
 81 Amos  v.  Comm’r,  T.C. Memo 2003-329 (2003). 
 82 Id. at 1, 5. 
 83 Id. at 5. 
 84 Id. at 6. 
 85 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 4. 
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indicated that there had to be some physical injury, it failed to address 
lingering questions about the veracity of the underlying claim and the 
severity of the injury.88  The court’s decision left open the question of 
whether the physical injury, no matter how slight, had to take place as an 
immediate consequence of the tort or whether the physical injury could 
result from a manifestation of an emotional distress injury.89 
E. Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (2006) (Murphy I) 
Murphy I is a case that sent shock waves throughout the tax world.90  
In Murphy I, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
addressed the applicability of the amended section 104(a)(2)—and the 
“physical” injury requirement—to purely emotional distress tort damages 
awards.91  The Murphy taxpayer suffered emotional distress after she was 
“blacklisted” by her employer for filing a complaint against the employer 
with state authorities.92  The taxpayer subsequently filed a tort claim and 
received compensatory damages for emotional distress and injury to 
professional reputation.93  The taxpayer then claimed that this money 
damages award was not taxable because it was received on account of 
physical injury because she had suffered some physical manifestations of 
her emotional injury, including “teeth grinding . . . which may cause 
permanent tooth damage[,] . . . shortness of breath, and dizziness.”94  The 
taxpayer also claimed that section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional because it 
failed to exclude revenue that is not income under the Sixteenth 
Amendment.95 
 
 88 See Cory, supra note 10, at 257–58 (arguing that the Amos court  interpreted  section  104(a)(2)’s  
physical  injury  requirement  in  a  broader  manner  than  that  put  forth  by  the  IRS  and  concluding  that  “[i]n  
accordance with Amos, it can be argued that the minimum requirements of §104(a)(2) are that an 
individual must experience (1) a physical touching, and (2) that as a result of the touching the individual 
experiences  pain”). 
 89 See Doti, supra note 5,   at   75   (“It   is   not   clear,   however,   whether   more   serious   physical  
manifestations of emotional distress, such as a nervous breakdown or heart attack, will constitute 
physical injury.”).   See also Sharon E. Stedman, Note, Congress's Amendment to Section 104 of the Tax 
Code Will Not Clarify the Tax Treatment of Damages and Will Lead to Arbitrary Distinctions, 21 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387,  405  (1997)  (arguing  that  “the  tax  treatment  of  damages  should  not  depend  on  
the arbitrary distinction of whether the taxpayer is fortunate (or unfortunate) enough to have sustained a 
physical  injury”). 
 90 Murphy  v.  I.R.S.,  460  F.3d  79  (D.C.  Cir.  2006)  (“Murphy I”).  See Germain, supra note 24, at 
186  (declaring  that  “[a]  unanimous  panel  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  District  of  Columbia  
recently dropped a bombshell on federal income tax jurisprudence by holding in Murphy v. I.R.S. 
[(Murphy I)]  that  Congress  violated  the  United  States  Constitution”) (emphasis added); Karpov, supra 
note 5, at 144 (stating that the Murphy I  court  “rendered  a  monumental  decision  that  could  change the 
course of damages taxation”);;  Wood,  Waiting to Exhale, supra note 26,  at  719  (stating  that  “in  the  wake  
of the first iteration of Murphy, many observers had feared that once one domino in the 
unconstitutionality   chain   toppled,   virtually   no   tax  would   be   safe   from   constitutional   attack”   and   that  
because of Murphy I   “there   was   near hysteria in some sectors about undermining the scope of 
congressional taxing powers”) (emphasis added). 
 91 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 80–81. 
 92 Id. at 81. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 84–85. 
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The court disagreed with the taxpayer on the first point and decided 
that—despite the fact that the taxpayer “suffered from certain physical 
manifestations of emotional distress”—the written record indicated that the 
award she received was for “mental pain and anguish” and, therefore, was 
not received on account of a physical injury or sickness.96  However, the 
court also held that section 104(a)(2) was unconstitutional because 
Congress was barred by the Sixteenth Amendment from taxing tort 
compensation that was deemed not income.97  The court argued that the 
damages awarded to the taxpayer “were awarded to make Murphy 
emotionally and reputationally ‘whole’ and not to compensate her for lost 
wages or taxable earnings of any kind.”98  This decision is important for 
two reasons.  First, the court acknowledged that the word “physical” is 
ambiguous and that the possibility exists that some physical manifestations 
of emotional distress may rise to the level of the “physical” injury 
requirement of section 104(a)(2).99  Second, the court concluded that 
section 104(a)(2)’s disparate treatment of similarly situated taxpayers is a 
violation of the Constitution because it excluded revenue that is deemed not 
income—such as that received for a physical injury—while it taxed other 
revenue that is similarly not income—such as that received for a physical 
manifestation of a non-physical injury.100  The serious constitutional 
implications of Murphy I meant that its staying power was doubtful as is 
evidenced by the next episode in the Murphy saga. 
F. Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (2007) (Murphy II) 
Less than one year after the Murphy I decision, the same Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed itself in the Murphy II 
decision.101  Looking at the same facts and essentially the same arguments 
as in Murphy I, the court came to a remarkably different conclusion.102  
Similar to its previous decision, the court first reasoned that the taxpayer’s 
 
 96 Id. at 84. 
 97 Id. at 88. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id. at 84; Wood, Waiting to Exhale, supra note 26,  at  721  (“At least Murphy I noted that 
the  question  [of  what  is  a  “physical”  injury]  was  confusing  and  that  the  IRS  has  done  little  to  remedy  
that posture.”).  See also Karpov, supra note 5, at 149 (suggesting that the Murphy I court simply 
followed   the   Internal  Revenue  Service’s   early   interpretations   of   the   predecessor   to   section   104(a)(2)  
where  the  Service  determined  that  “compensation  for  a  nonphysical  tort . . . constituted a replacement, 
and not a gain, of human capital, and thus was not within the definition of income”). 
 100 Murphy I, 460 F.3d at 89: 
That emotional distress and loss of reputation were both actionable in tort when the 
Sixteenth Amendment was adopted supports the view that compensation for these 
nonphysical injuries was not regarded differently than was compensation for physical 
injuries and, therefore, was not considered income by the framers of the Amendment and 
the state legislatures that ratified it. 
 101 Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170 (2007)   (“Murphy II”).    The court—acting on its own and 
without any prompting from either of the parties—vacated the Murphy I decision and ordered a 
rehearing where it ultimately overturned the Murphy I decision. 
 102 Id. at 171. 
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recovery was intended as recompense for emotional distress suffered and 
not for physical injury or physical manifestations of emotional distress.103  
Next, the court concluded that the imposition of tax on a tort damages 
award for non-physical personal injury did indeed fall within Congress’ tax 
powers as prescribed by the Constitution and by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of what constitutes income.104  The court reached this 
conclusion by applying the sweeping definition of income conveyed by the 
Supreme Court in Glenshaw Glass.105 
The Murphy II court’s sudden reversal led some scholars to speculate 
that the court was under considerable external pressure to reconsider its 
earlier position.106  This speculation is bolstered by the reasoning and ease 
with which the Murphy II court dismissed the Sixteenth Amendment 
argument it applied in Murphy I.107  It is important to note that the issue of 
what is a “physical” injury—and whether physical manifestations of 
emotional distress fall within the rubric of section 104(a)(2)—was not fully 
addressed in either opinion, leaving little judicial guidance on the meaning 
of “physical.”108  However, the court implied, in both cases, that the 
definition of “physical” and the applicability of the “on account of” 
phrasing of section 104(a)(2) remained questionable.109  This section has 
highlighted the difficulty the courts have experienced in applying section 
104(a)(2).  The next section analyzes some of the underlying principles, as 
well as the tort law, medical science, ethical, and prudential reasons that 
make section 104(a)(2) an inequitable tax provision. 
 
 103 Id. at 176. 
 104 Id. at  179  (“[A]lthough the Congress cannot make a thing income which is not so in fact, . . . it 
can label a  thing  income  and  tax  it,  so  long  as  it  acts  within  its  constitutional  authority.”). 
 105 Id. (stating that I.R.C. § 61(a)   defines   gross   income   as   “all   income   from whatever source 
derived”   and   citing  Comm’r   v.   Glenshaw  Glass  Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955), where the Supreme 
Court defined income to include all instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and 
over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.  This supported the   Court’s conclusion that 
Murphy’s  tort  recovery  is  included  in  both  the  statutory  and  the  interpretational  definitions  of  income). 
 106 See Germain, supra note 24, at 187–88 n.8; Karpov, supra note 5, at 182; Wood, Waiting to 
Exhale, supra note 26, at 724. 
 107 See Wood, Waiting to Exhale, supra note 26, at 724–25: 
The about-face, the court says, is attributable to a new and novel argument the IRS raised 
for the first time in its petition for rehearing en banc (of course, the court denied that 
motion).  This new and novel argument, says the court, is that while  Murphy’s   recovery  
may not be income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment, Congress can still tax it 
without violating the Constitution. 
 108 See id. at 721 (stating  that  “[t]he  first  Murphy  opinion  did  not  answer  the  question  of  just  what  
constitutes   physical   injuries”   and   that   “the   court   doesn’t   offer   any   comments   about   this   issue   in   the  
second go-round [in Murphy II]”). 
 109 Karpov, supra note 5,  at  184  (“The Murphy II decision has not given an acceptable answer to 
the   taxability   of   nonphysical   personal   injury   awards   because   the   court’s   reasoning   was   noticeably  
result-driven  and  weaved  in  and  out  of  arguments  with  a  motive  to  end  with  a  taxable  result.”). 
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III.  ANALYSIS:  HOW THE “ON ACCOUNT OF” REQUIREMENT OF I.R.C. 
§ 104(a)(2) LEADS TO THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF SIMILARLY 
SITUATED TAXPAYERS 
The problem at the heart of the current iteration of section 104(a)(2) is 
in the seemingly arbitrary, one-way direction in which the exclusion 
applies. 110  The three words “on account of” are interpreted to mean that 
any consequence stemming from an initial physical injury may be 
excludable regardless of how indirect the connection.111  For example, a 
young girl is injured in an accident at a negligently supervised swimming 
pool and is partially paralyzed as a result.  The child rightfully recovers for 
her injuries based on a tort claim against the owner of the pool.112  Clearly, 
any damages—except for punitives—recovered by the young girl are fully 
excludable.113  However, the child’s parents also suffer purely emotional 
distress both from witnessing the accident and from dealing with the 
subsequent condition of their daughter.  If the parents sue and recover 
damages for their purely emotional injuries, then, according to the Schleier 
decision, the parents are also allowed to exclude the recovered damages 
under section 104(a)(2).114  It is important to note that the parents’ money 
damages recovery is not based on any physical injury or sickness to either 
of the parents themselves.  Rather, this seemingly counterintuitive result is 
based solely on the notion that section 104(a)(2) applies in a forward-
looking manner.  Any injury or harm that results after the initial physical 
injury—including a subsequent purely emotional distress injury to a 
different person, such as a parent—may be excludable because that 
subsequent injury was suffered “on account of” the initial personal physical 
injury to the child.115 
 
 110 See id. at 149–52 (explaining that prior to the  addition  of   the  “physical”   injury   requirement,  
section 104(a)(2) applied to people who suffered physical manifestations of emotional distress).  See 
also Stedman, supra note 89, at 387–89 (stating that Congress slightly over-reacted when it added the 
“physical”  requirement  in  the  1996  amendment  and  that  this  over-reaction was likely due to the fact that 
Congress wanted to clarify the terms of the exclusion.  Congress also acted out of fear that the tax code 
might be abused by people who filed and recovered tort damages based on fraudulent emotional distress 
claims.    Stedman  argues  that  the  addition  of  the  “physical”  requirement  swung  the  pendulum  too  far  in  
the other direction thus leading to the disparate treatment of people who recover tort damages for 
legitimate, verifiable physical manifestations of emotional distress by denying them the benefits of the 
exclusion.      Stedman   concludes   that   “[t]he   ambiguous   term   ‘personal   injury’   has   been   replaced   by  
‘personal  physical  injury,’  a term that is equally ambiguous”). 
 111 See Wood, Waiting to Exhale, supra note 26,  at  722  (explaining  that  “[a]  payment  can  be  ‘on  
account  of’  physical  injuries  or  sickness  even  if  the  plaintiff is not injured but recovers on behalf of an 
injured  party”  and  stating  that  “[e]xamples  include  recoveries  for  loss  of  consortium  (based  on  physical  
injury to a spouse) and wrongful death”). 
 112 The relevant tort claim would likely be based in negligence and/or products liability. 
 113 See supra Part   II.B.   The   young   girl’s   recovery   would   qualify   for   the   section   104(a)(2)  
exclusion because—under the Schleier test—her claim is a tort or tort-like claim and she suffered a 
significant physical injury.  In addition, the 1989 amendment to section 104(a)(2) prohibited punitive 
damages from excludability. 
 114 Wood, Waiting to Exhale, supra note 26, at 722–23. 
 115 Id. 
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The converse situation is where the real problem arises.116  If a person 
suffers a purely emotional injury that later causes or leads to the 
manifestation of a verifiable physical injury, then any recovery that person 
receives, whether for the emotional or the physical injury, is not excludable 
under section 104(a)(2) and, thus, is fully taxable.117  For example, an 
employee is fired for acting as a whistle-blower and revealing fraudulent 
business practices to a regulatory agency.  As a result of the increased 
stress caused by the firing, the employee cannot find another job and 
subsequently files suit for wrongful termination.  The employee continues 
to suffer emotional problems and is soon diagnosed with Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and severe depression.  Within six months of 
being fired, the employee begins to suffer serious physical manifestations 
of emotional distress.  These physical manifestations include serious 
weight loss, hypertension, and stomach ulcers.  The employee eventually 
wins the wrongful termination lawsuit and recovers money damages for the 
emotional and physical injuries, as well as for lost wages and punitive 
damages.  However, because the initial injury was purely emotional the 
wrongfully terminated employee will have to pay tax on the total 
recovery.118 
When Congress enacted the 1996 amendments to section 104(a)(2) 
and added the word “physical,” its primary intention was to eliminate the 
exclusion for purely emotional injuries and to narrow the exclusion to those 
who suffered real, verifiable physical injuries.119  This change in direction 
was based largely on Congress’ distrust of tort claimants who could 
“easily” falsify or exaggerate an emotional injury in order to recover 
money damages.120  However, Congress left the issue of the origin of the 
physical injury in question.121  If the intent of Congress was to provide tax 
relief for people who suffered physical injuries, then the way the physical 
injury came about should be, in theory, secondary to the fact that there is 
 
 116 See Hubbard, supra note 75,   at   745   (questioning   the   motive   and   propriety   of   Congress’s  
actions in limiting the applicability of section 104(a)(2) to those situations where the tort recovery is on 
account of a physical injury while physical manifestations of emotional distress are not excludable). 
 117 See Whittington, supra note 13,   at   176   (“The   tax   code   also   does   not   allow   a   taxpayer   to  
exclude  amounts  received  for  physical  injuries  that  flow  from  an  emotional  injury.”). 
 118 See generally Wood, Tax Treatment of Settlements, supra note 38. 
 119 Doti, supra note 5, at 72–74   (discussing   Congress’   intent   to   narrow   the   scope   of   section  
104(a)(2) as the major driving force behind the 1996 amendments). 
 120 See Leeper, supra note 16, at 1057 (arguing that, in enacting the 1996 amendments to section 
104(a)(2),   “Congress   [may   have]   feared   a   flood   of   frivolous   claims   (i.e.,   suits   alleging   that   a   large 
portion of damages came from emotional distress and other difficult-to-prove, nonphysical injuries) 
were it to allow the exclusion to encompass all types of harms”).   See also Hobbs, supra note 11, at 88 
(“A   variety   of   reasons were given [as the intent behind the 1996 amendments to section 104(a)(2)], 
including  concerns  over  proof  and  valuation,  the  fear  of  fraudulent  claims,  and  a  flood  of  litigation.”). 
 121 See Cory, supra note 10,   at   248   (stating   that   “[d]ue   to   the   vague   nature   of   §104(a)(2), the 
courts   have   had   difficulty   limiting   the   scope   of,   as   well   as   defining,   “personal   injuries”   under  
§104(a)(2)”   and   that   “deciphering  what   constitutes   a   ‘personal   physical   injury’ has remained largely 
ambiguous”). 
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indeed a physical injury.122  The intent of Congress would be satisfied as 
long as there is a provable causal link between the initial incident and the 
subsequent physical injury thus making the recovery excludable under 
section 104(a)(2).123 
The United States Tax Court addressed the issue of verifiability and 
the possibility of fraud in the Amos case.124  The Amos court made a rather 
revealing statement when it declared: “[w]hether the settlement payment is 
excludable from gross income under section 104(a)(2) depends on the 
nature and character of the claim asserted, and not upon the validity of that 
claim.”125  So, a physically injured individual whose claim may or may not 
be valid is fully entitled to reap the benefits of the section 104(a)(2) 
exclusion.126  However, an individual who has suffered a legitimate, 
verifiable physical manifestation of an emotional distress injury is not 
entitled to any favorable tax treatment regardless of the validity of that 
person’s claim.127  The absurdity of these highly disparate outcomes is self-
evident.128  If the issue of verifiability was Congress’ main reason for 
adding the “physical” injury requirement, then the fact that invalid claims 
can and do exist in both purely physical and purely emotional injury claims 
shows that this was not likely the predominant reason why Congress added 
the “physical” requirement.129 
If two equally legitimate tort claims arise, one stemming from an 
initial physical injury, the other emotional at first and physical later, then 
both claimants should be entitled to the same treatment under the tax law.  
If the intent of Congress was to provide tax relief for people who suffered 
physical injuries, then it should not matter how the physical injury came 
about. As long as there is a provable causal link between the initial tort for 
which money damages were obtained and the subsequent physical injury.130  
 
 122 Stedman, supra note 89, at 408–09 (discussing the absurdity of distinguishing between 
different types of physical injuries). 
 123 See Leeper, supra note 16, at 1065 (arguing that a causal link between the tort and the injury 
was the primary method used before the 1996 amendment and  concluding  that  “by  requiring  courts  to  
distinguish between physical and nonphysical injury and examine sometimes unclear chains of 
causation, the ambiguity of the physical injury requirement of section 104(a)(2) creates the possibility 
of arbitrariness in application”). 
 124 Amos, T.C. Memo 2003-329 at 5–6.  The petitioner in Amos suffered an internal injury to the 
groin, however, there were no visible signs of injury and the severity of the injury was highly 
questionable.  For a detailed analysis of Amos, see supra Part II.D. 
 125 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 126 Id. 
 127 See Whittington, supra note 13, at 176–77. 
 128 See e.g. Stedman, supra note 89,  at  405  (stating  that  “[a]  victim  of . . . sexual harassment has 
suffered  no   less  of  an   injury   than  a   taxpayer  who  broke  a   leg   in  a  car  accident”  and  concluding that 
“Congress  should  not  treat  a  taxpayer  who  is  a  victim  of  sexual  harassment  differently  from  a  taxpayer  
who is a victim of a car accident”). 
 129 See Leeper, supra note 16,  at  1071  (“Whatever  the  validity of such claims, requiring a showing 
of a physical injury for tax exclusion can only create the potential for disputes and differing treatment of 
taxpayers  who  have  suffered  similar  harms.”). 
 130 See generally Hobbs, supra note 11, at 55–56 (discussing the motives and the intent of 
Congress  in  adding  the  “physical”  injury  requirement  and  concluding  that  section  104(a)(2)’s  disparate  
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However, section 104(a)(2) essentially discriminates between similarly 
situated taxpayers and leads to inequitable treatment in a system founded 
on principles of uniformity.131  While several courts have faced the 
question of whether section 104(a)(2) should apply to tort damages 
awarded for a physical manifestation of an emotional distress injury, to 
date, in all of these decisions these courts have declined to extend the 
application of section 104(a)(2) to physical manifestations of emotional 
distress.132  It is worth noting, however, that none of these cases dealt with 
a relatively serious form of physical manifestation caused by emotional 
distress.  The unidirectional—and inherently inequitable—impact of 
section 104(a)(2) is best illustrated through the real-life examples presented 
in the next section. 
A. Hypothetical Situations:  Two Detailed Scenarios that Illustrate the 
Inequity of Section 104(a)(2) 
Elena is a 42 year old single woman.  She is a full-time employee at a 
leading biotech company where she is a clinical data manager.  Elena’s 
immediate supervisor, Richard, has repeatedly made unwelcome sexual 
advances toward her.  Richard has frequently touched Elena despite her 
constant refusal to submit to his advances.  Richard’s non-consensual 
 
treatment of similarly situated taxpayers may only be resolved via a complete repeal of section 
104(a)(2)). 
 131 See Infanti supra note 23, at 1198–201 (discussing the notion that the Tax Code was founded 
on principles of equity which entail uniform treatment of similarly situated individuals who are subject 
to the provisions of the Code). 
 132 See Germain, supra note 24, at 204–05 n.82 (supporting the claim that no court has yet to 
apply the section 104(a)(2) exclusion to physical manifestations of emotional distress by citing several 
decisions including: 
Lindsey v. Commissioner, 422 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding business tort claim 
recoveries not excludable because   taxpayer’s   “hypertension   and  stress-related symptoms, 
including periodic impotency, insomnia, fatigue, occasional indigestion, and urinary 
incontinence . . . relate   to   emotional   distress,   and   not   to   physical   sickness”);;   Goode   v.  
Commissioner,  91  T.C.M.  (CCH)  901  (2006)  (rejecting  “physical  injury”  characterization  
in settlement agreement, and holding that employee’s  claimed  “repeated,  vehement  verbal  
assaults”  which  caused  him  physical  pain  and  suffering  did  not  constitute  physical  injury);;  
Ndirika v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (RIA) 2004-250 (2004) (holding there was no credible 
evidence employment settlement to compensate for previous miscarriage or pregnancy-
related pain and suffering); Lindsey v. Commissioner, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (2004) 
(holding   that   hypertension   leading   to   “fatigability,   occasional   indigestion, and difficulty 
sleeping—are the types of injuries or sicknesses that Congress intended to be encompassed 
within   the  definition  of   emotional   distress”);;  Shaltz  v.  Commissioner,   85  T.C.M.   (CCH)  
1489 (2003) (holding that sexual harassment settlement is not excludable because no 
evidence of physical injury,  only  “depression,  anxiety,  stress,  and  recurrent  past  stressors”  
caused   by   “depression   and   trauma   at   work”);;   Henderson   v.   Commissioner,   85   T.C.M.  
(CCH) 1469 (2003) (holding that $5,000 settlement of credit reporting claim not 
excludable despite  “life-threatening, pre-existing  physical  illness”  exacerbated  by  the  harm  
to his personal reputation); Prasil v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124 (2003) 
(holding that allegations of severe physical manifestations from sex discrimination and 
harassment not sufficient to establish physical injury or physical sickness); Witcher v. 
Commissioner, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 582 (2002) (holding that physical manifestations caused 
by defamation and business torts are not physical injury or physical sickness)). 
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touching, however, does not cause any physical injuries to Elena.  Richard 
has also consistently threatened Elena that he will make her work life 
miserable if she does not submit to his sexual advances.  Elena endures this 
harassment for over two years and she starts seeing a psychiatrist because 
she experiences elevated stress levels, mild anxiety, and depression.  She 
files complaints with the management, as well as human resources, but 
nothing is done.  Eventually, the stress causes Elena to start missing work.  
Finally, Elena’s job performance deteriorates to the point where she is 
placed on probation and eventually fired.  Elena’s life is turned upside 
down as she struggles to make ends meet.  Her anxiety worsens and her 
depression becomes so severe that she sometimes spends the entire day in 
bed without a will or an inclination to do anything productive.  In addition, 
Elena eats very little, begins to lose weight, and has acute insomnia.  
Ultimately, all these emotional injuries begin to take a serious toll on 
Elena’s physical health.  She loses forty pounds of weight—to the point 
where her doctors classify her as anorexic, she develops several stomach 
ulcers that lead to moderate digestive system pain, and she has recurring 
migraine headaches of moderate to extreme severity that vary in duration 
from a few minutes to several hours at a time.  Elena continues to see her 
psychiatrist throughout this ordeal.  Her relatives convince her to find an 
attorney and she eventually files a sexual harassment lawsuit against her 
former employer.  Her case is strengthened by the fact that the discovery 
process exposes two other sexual harassment complaints against her 
previous supervisor.  In addition, Elena’s attorney finds out that her 
previous supervisor was fired subsequent to an internal investigation that 
revealed highly damaging evidence.  Elena’s lawyer and her previous 
employer eventually reach a settlement agreement whereby Elena is paid 
$200,000 in damages.  The settlement agreement states that the payment is 
for Elena’s pain, suffering, and lost wages. 
Under the current interpretation and application of section 104(a)(2), 
Elena will have to pay taxes on the entire amount of the settlement.  This is 
due to the fact that her initial injuries were purely emotional and that her 
physical injuries manifested themselves as a result of the emotional distress 
and not as a result of the sexual harassment itself.  Elena’s injuries started 
out as depression and anxiety but these conditions eventually manifested 
themselves into serious physical conditions such as the pain from the 
ulcers, the migraine headaches, and the dangerous drop in body weight.  
Nonetheless, Elena is taxed on the entire amount of her recovery because 
her recovery was not based “on account of a physical injury or sickness.”  
After paying attorney’s fees (33 percent) and federal taxes (35 percent), 
Elena is left with approximately $87,000—less than half of what she 
recovered. 
Now, a look at the other end of the spectrum.  Ron is a healthy young 
man who works as a delivery truck driver.  He exercises on a regular basis 
at his local fitness center.  During one of his exercise sessions Ron is 
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injured when a weightlifting machine malfunctions.  His injuries are not 
severe but he is unable to drive as a result of pain in his arms and 
shoulders.  Ron files a negligence tort claim against the owner of the fitness 
center.  Ron seeks damages for pain, suffering and lost wages.  The two 
sides eventually reach a settlement agreement through non-binding 
arbitration.  The settlement is for $200,000. 
The tax treatment for Ron’s recovery is straightforward.  Under 
section 104(a)(2) Ron does not have to pay any tax on the amounts 
recovered by virtue of the fact that his recovery was on account of a 
physical injury.  After attorney’s fees (33 percent), Ron is left with 
$134,000.  Consequently, Ron’s injuries healed fairly quickly and he 
returned to work three months after the accident.  Elena, on the other hand, 
is faced with several years of medical and psychiatric treatment before she 
can return to the job market.  In addition, the long term damage to Elena’s 
physical and psychological well being will impact her quality of life into 
the foreseeable future. 
The unfair tax treatment afforded to these two hypothetical people 
shows the lack of uniformity and the inequity that lies at the heart of 
section 104(a)(2).  It is a given that both Ron and Elena suffered injuries 
for which they were entitled to tort damages recovery.  However, the 
seriousness of the injuries suffered and the long term impact on the lives of 
these two people are clearly different.  Elena keeps just over one-third of 
what she received while Ron keeps two-thirds.  However, Elena is faced 
with a long and arduous uphill battle before she returns to any semblance of 
her life as she used to know it, while Ron returns to work and leads a 
normal life after a short period.  There is no logical tax policy or 
humanitarian reason why Elena has to pay income taxes on her recovery 
while Ron pays no income taxes on his.  In contrast to the way section 
104(a)(2) treats physical manifestations of emotional distress, medical 
science has established a link between emotional and physical well-
being.133 
B. Medical Science:  There is a Nexus Between Emotional Injuries and 
Physical Manifestations 
Through the one-sided application of section 104(a)(2), the Code 
treats equally situated individuals differently by failing to recognize that 
legitimate physical injuries can result from emotional distress.134  
 
 133 See infra Part III.B. 
 134 See Leeper, supra note 16, at 1067–68   (“Not only is the statute [section 104(a)(2)] itself 
arbitrary by drawing without logical support a distinction between sufferers of physical and nonphysical 
injury, but by doing so it also creates ambiguity and opens the door to interpretation and thus potentially 
arbitrary   application   by   the   judicial   system.”);;   Timothy R. Palmer, Internal Revenue Code Section 
104(a)(2) and the Exclusion of Personal Injury Damages: A Model of Inconsistency, 15 J. CORP. L. 83, 
127 (1989) (arguing that section 104(a)(2) was applied—both by the courts and by the I.R.S.—in an 
arbitrary  manner  and  that  “[t]he  time  has  come  for  the  adoption  of  consistent  principles  in  determining  
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Historically, the link between mental and physical health was the subject of 
much research and hypothesizing.135  Philosophers, including Aristotle, 
Descartes, and Kant, theorized about the relationship between mind and 
body with the debate centering on whether the mind and the body are 
inseparably linked, or whether each exists notwithstanding the other.136  
However, in modern times, the world of physical and psychological 
medicine has reached a consensus that an affirmative relationship exists 
between emotional distress and physical manifestations of that distress.137  
Many members of the psychological care community continue to 
emphasize the importance of studying, understanding, and addressing the 
impact of emotional distress on the physical condition of a patient.138 
There are many examples of physical ailments that can be brought on 
by emotional distress.139  One author, Shelley Taylor, states that “[a]nxiety, 
depression, and other psychological disorders are accompanied by a 
number of physical symptoms.”140  Taylor goes on to provide some 
examples: “Anxiety can produce diarrhea, upset stomach, sweaty hands, 
shortness of breath, difficulty in sleeping, poor concentration, and general 
agitation.  Depression can lead to fatigue, difficulty in performing everyday 
activities, listlessness, loss of appetite, and sleep disturbances.”141  In 
addition, many of these symptoms, such as loss of appetite, anxiety, and 
stress, can lead to other, more serious physical injuries, such as stomach 
ulcers, high blood pressure, diabetes, and extreme pain.142  Accordingly, the 
Code should not treat these serious physical injuries differently, regardless 
 
the tax consequences of a damage award received for personal injuries”). 
 135 See generally JOHN G. BENJAFIELD, A HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 2005). 
 136 See JACK H. ORNSTEIN, THE MIND AND THE BRAIN 3–19  (1972)  (discussing  Descartes’  view  
of the mind-body relationship).  See also BENJAFIELD, supra note 135, at 15–42 (detailing the 
development and evolution of the modern understanding of the mind-body relationship and the origins 
of the study of psychology, including an examination of the views of Aristotle, René Descartes and 
Immanuel Kant). 
 137 See SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 3–7 (2d ed. 1991) (describing the scientific 
belief, spanning many centuries, that there is an integral mind-body connection, one through which 
harm  to  the  mind  can  lead  to  physical  injury  and  declaring  that  “[i]t  is  now  known  that  physical  health  
is inextricably interwoven with the psychological and social environment: All conditions of health and 
illness . . . are influenced by psychological and social factors”).   See also Burke & Friel, supra note 15, 
at  179  (stating  that  “scientific research has brought an awareness of the potentially devastating physical 
impacts of psychological injuries”);;   Hubbard, supra note 75, at 751–52 (discussing the valid and 
serious implications of emotional distress on the physical well-being and stating that “mental  trauma  is  
a real experience; those who suffer mental distress suffer an actual loss”). 
 138 Infanti, supra note 23, at 1237–38 (discussing a recent trend by psychologists to study the 
mental  health  effects  of  discrimination  and  concluding  that  “[a]mong  the  negative  mental  health effects 
reported by these studies were emotional distress, depression, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, anxiety, 
stress, and somatization (i.e., the conversion of anxiety  into  physical  symptoms)”). 
 139 See, e.g., Germain, supra note 24, at 193 (describing the physical ailments that afflicted the 
petitioner in Murphy v. I.R.S. including “anxiety   attacks,   shortness   of   breath,   and   dizziness”   that  
resulted  from  Murphy’s initial emotional distress injury). 
 140 See TAYLOR, supra note 137, at 275–76. 
 141 Id. at 276. 
 142 Id. at 192, 347 (stating that stress can lead to an increase in heart rate, blood pressure and blood 
sugar   and   adding   that   “anxiety-producing conditions . . . can   lead   to   the   formation   of   ulcers”   while 
“anxiety  can  increase  pain”). 
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of whether they are caused by an initial physical injury or subsequent to an 
emotional distress injury.143  The expansive field of tort law has also 
recognized the integral relationship between emotional distress and 
physical manifestations of that emotional distress.144 
C. Tort Law:  Physical Manifestations of Emotional Distress are Valid 
Forms of Tort Recovery 
As opposed to the relative ease of recovery in physical injury claims, 
the field of tort law has grappled with the notion of plaintiff recovery for 
purely emotional distress—and physical manifestations of emotional 
distress—injuries.145  The historical progression of emotional distress 
recoveries in tort law has evolved from one with an absolute physical 
injury requirement to the modern iteration of stand-alone emotional distress 
claims.146  This transformation took place despite the reluctance of some 
courts to acknowledge purely emotional distress claims primarily due to the 
misperception that the number of fraudulent claims would increase.147  
Today, the notion that non-frivolous tort claims can be brought for purely 
emotional distress claims—in addition to claims based on physical 
manifestations of emotional distress—has become a well-established 
rule.148 
Analysis of the “on account of” language in section 104(a)(2)—in the 
context of tort law—has frequently pointed to causation as an issue in 
 
 143 See Doti, supra note 5, at 79–80; Burke & Friel, supra note 15, at 195–96; Stedman, supra 
note 89, at 405; Whittington, supra note13, at 185. 
 144 See infra Part III.C.  See also Whittington, supra note 13,   at   185   (“As the areas of . . . tort 
law . . . and medicine have taken steps towards the recognition that emotional distress is a very real 
injury, Congress[, by adding the physical requirement to section 104(a)(2),] has caused the tax code to 
take  a  tremendous  leap  backwards.”). 
 145 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 29–30 (3d ed., Foundation 
Press 2007) (1997).  See also Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of 
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936) (describing the state of emotional distress claims during the 
early  history  of  tort  law  and  stating  that  “it is nevertheless true that the common law has been reluctant 
to   recognize   the   interest   in   one’s   peace   of   mind   as   deserving   of   general   and   independent   legal  
protection, even as against intentional invasions”). 
 146 See generally JON R. ABELE, EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: PROVING DAMAGES (2003). See also 
JOHN D. WINER ET AL., PROVING MENTAL & EMOTIONAL INJURIES §§ 2:31–2:33 (James Publishing 
2005). 
 147 See ABELE, supra note 146, at 70.  See also Hobbs, supra note 11, at   88   (“Courts   also  
discovered that their earlier concerns with proof and valuation were overstated; such claims more often 
than not presented the same difficulties as other components  of  personal  injury.”);;  Leeper,  supra note 
16, at 1070 (arguing that the fear of frivolous lawsuits,  evident  in  Congress’  addition  of  the  “physical” 
requirement to section 104(a)(2), is  “unfounded”  because  tort litigants are more likely to be motivated 
by the tort recovery itself rather than the tax consequences of such recovery). 
 148 ABELE, supra note 146,   at   70   (explaining   that  most   “[j]urisdictions   that   impose   the physical 
manifestation rule require that the plaintiff exhibit a physical injury from the emotional distress 
suffered”).  See also Hobbs, supra note 11, at 88 (discussing the evolution of tort law and the transition 
of most courts from resistance to acceptance of purely emotional distress causes of action and 
concluding  that  “[t]oday,  a  clear  majority  of  states  recognize  emotional  distress  as an independent cause 
of action”);;  Whittington,   supra note 13, at 174–76 (discussing the fact that many courts have moved 
away from the physical manifestation rule to more liberal rules allowing purely emotional injury claims 
and  that  the  “claimant  must  still  prove  he  has  suffered  an  emotional distress type injury”). 
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proving that a physical injury was caused by emotional distress.149  
However, the vast majority of courts have recognized that a legitimate 
causal link can and often does exist between an initial emotional distress 
incident and subsequent physical manifestations.150  Clearly, the field of 
tort law has accepted and even embraced the notion that legitimate, 
provable cases of physical manifestations of emotional distress are 
deserving of the very same monetary damages recoveries afforded to those 
who suffer purely physical injuries.151   
Unfortunately, under the current interpretation and application of 
section 104(a)(2), the tax code runs contrary to tort law—and, by 
extension, to the world of medical science—because the tax code denies 
the personal injury tax exclusion for individuals who suffer real, verifiable 
physical injuries that manifest themselves as a consequence of emotional 
distress.152  In addition to medical science and tort law, there are two 
conceptions of justice—horizontal equity and return of human capital —
that illustrate the unfairness of section 104(a)(2). 
D. Horizontal Equity and Human Capital:  How I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) is 
 
 149 See Lee, supra note 53,  at  552,  555  (stating  that  “a  causal  connection  must  exist  between  the  
personal  injury  and  the  damages  received”  and  that  the  “on  account  of  language  ostensibly employs a 
causal analysis”);;  Whittington,   supra note 13, at 161 (“When  pleading,  proving  or   settling  emotional  
distress damages in a tort suit, the tort practitioner is well advised to make certain the emotional distress 
damages are causally linked to a demonstrable and recoverable physical injury.  Otherwise, the client's 
emotional  distress  recovery  will  be  taxable.”). 
 150 See Haralson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 564 F. Supp. 2d 616, 622 (N.D. Tex. 2008) 
(stating   that   “[t]he clear weight of authority holds that physical symptoms of emotional distress 
constitute   a   “bodily   injury”   in   the   insurance   context”   and   citing   numerous   cases   in   support   of   that  
statement including: 
Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 
(M.D. Ala.   2000)   (emotional   trauma   can   constitute   “bodily   injury”   if   accompanied   by  
physical symptoms); General Star Indemnity Co. v. Schools Excess Liability Fund, 888 F. 
Supp. 1022, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (physical injury resulting from emotional distress 
constitutes  “bodily   injury”);;  Garvis v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 497 N.W.2d 254, 
257 (Minn. 1993) (emotional distress with appreciable physical manifestations can qualify 
as   a   “bodily   injury”   within   the  meaning   of   an   insurance   policy); Voorhees v. Preferred 
Mutual Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1262 (N.J. 1992) (emotional distress resulting in 
headaches,   stomach   pains,   nausea,   and   body   pains   constituted   “bodily   injury”   under  
homeowner’s  policy);;  Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Waisanen, 653 F .Supp. 825, 832 
(D.S.D. 1987) (emotional distress accompanied by high blood pressure was sufficient to 
establish physical harm); Kufalk v. Hart, 636 F. Supp. 309, 311–12 (N.D. Ill. 1986) 
(emotional distress resulting in high blood pressure, headaches, stomach pains, and 
diarrhea  constituted  “bodily   injury”  under  general   liability  policy);;  McGuire v. American 
States Ins. Co., 491 So.2d 606, 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (mental distress accompanied 
by headaches and muscle spasms, requiring treatment and medication, could be construed 
as  “bodily  injury”  under  insurance  policy);;  Holcomb v. Kincaid, 406 So.2d 646, 649 (La. 
Ct. App. 1981) (emotional distress resulting in rash, hair loss, weight loss, and symptoms 
of  stroke  fell  within  definition  of  “bodily  injury”  in  homeowner’s  policy). 
 151 See ABELE, supra note 146, at 70–71; Germain, supra note 24, at 196; Hubbard, supra note 75, 
at 748. 
 152 See, e.g., Murphy v. I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007)  (“Murphy II”).    See also Burke & 
Friel, supra note 15,   at   168   (“[N]o   substantial   policy-based justification was advanced for 
distinguishing  between  physical  and  nonphysical  injuries.”). 
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Inherently Unfair 
Horizontal equity and return of human capital are two inter-related 
notions of basic equity and justice that permeate the foundation of our 
various systems of laws, including the tax code.153  Horizontal equity 
describes the “notion of justice that similarly situated people should be 
treated equally and that people with equal incomes should pay equal 
taxes.”154  Looking back at Elena and Ron in the hypothetical situations 
above, it is obvious that section 104(a)(2) violates the concept of horizontal 
equity because it treats similarly situated individuals in an inequitable 
manner.  The concept of return of human capital involves the notion that 
money received to help restore a person’s body and mind to its state before 
the tortious act took place should not be taxed because there is no gain—
and therefore no taxable income—for that individual.155  Again, in the two 
hypothetical situations, Elena and Ron both received tort damages awards 
to restore them to their previous state of well-being.  Yet, the fact that one 
pays taxes and the other does not further illustrates the inequity of section 
104(a)(2). 
This analysis has focused on the inequitable treatment of similarly 
situated individuals under section 104(a)(2).  Those individuals are ones 
who suffered real, verifiable physical injuries and recovered money 
damages awards under established notions of tort law.  Yet, this analysis 
has shown that these individuals are treated differently by section 104(a)(2) 
simply because of the timing of the physical injury suffered.  If the tort 
directly caused the physical injury, then the money damages received are 
not taxed.  However, if the tort caused purely emotional distress that later 
leads to physical manifestations of that distress, the money damages 
received are fully taxed.  This analysis has presented two hypothetical 
situations to illustrate the nature and severity of this inequity.  In addition, 
the evidence presented shows that both medical science and the field of tort 
law have recognized that a positive link does exist between emotional 
distress and physical manifestations of that distress.  Subsequently, basic 
notions of fairness and justice—horizontal equity and return of human 
capital—indicate that section 104(a)(2) treats similarly situated taxpayers 
in a disparate manner.  Finally, numerous courts have faced this very issue 
and, out of deference to the perceived congressional intent discussed 
throughout this comment, have refused to extend the application of section 
104(a)(2) to physical manifestations of emotional distress.156  The next 
section introduces a proposal that can resolve this inequity and continue to 
 
 153 See Lederman, supra note 32, at 701–04 (discussing the nature of horizontal equity and its 
influence on tax policy).  See also Doti, supra note 5, at 63–65 (explaining the significance of human 
capital as a basis for fair, equitable treatment under the tax code). 
 154 Chapman, supra note 6, at 407 n.3. 
 155 See Doti, supra note 5, at 63–65. 
 156 See Germain, supra note 24, at 204–05 n.82 (citing several examples of decisions where the 
courts have refused to apply section 104(a)(2) to physical manifestations of emotional distress). 
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uphold the intentions of Congress when it created, modified, and retained 
section 104(a)(2). 
IV.  PROPOSAL:  A SIMPLE ADDITION TO I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) WILL LEAD TO 
MORE EQUITABLE TAX LAW TREATMENT FOR SIMILARLY SITUATED 
TAXPAYERS 
Based on the authorities presented in this comment it is clear that the 
unidirectional application of section 104(a)(2) is inequitable, inherently 
unfair to similarly situated individuals and should be revised.  This 
comment has not argued, nor does it support the proposition that purely 
emotional injury tort recoveries should be excluded under section 
104(a)(2).  The intent of Congress was clear in that the drafters of the 1996 
amendment to section 104(a)(2) were cognizant of the possibility that 
purely emotional injuries are very difficult to prove and may often be based 
on fraudulent claims.  Instead, this comment focuses on one aspect of the 
application of section 104(a)(2): the fact that section 104(a)(2) does not 
apply to individuals who suffer legitimate, verifiable physical 
manifestations of emotional injuries and that section 104(a)(2) has led to a 
lack of uniformity and inequitable treatment under the tax code. 
This comment proposes that a simple addition to section 104(a)(2) 
will resolve the inequitable treatment currently rendered upon similarly 
situated taxpayers.  The semi-colon at the end of section 104(a)(2) should 
be deleted and the following phrase should be added: “or personal physical 
injuries proximately caused by emotional distress;”  This simple addition 
would allow those who have legitimate claims and subsequent recoveries to 
exclude from their taxes those amounts received on account of the physical 
injuries proximately caused by the emotional distress.  The proximate 
causation requirement mandates that the physical manifestation be proven 
according to the preponderance of evidence burden of proof currently used 
in civil law courts.157  This eight-word addition to section 104(a)(2) would 
reinstate the balance of equity for those who have suffered verifiable 
physical injuries regardless of whether the physical injury came first or 
resulted from an emotional distress injury. 
This addition would also preserve the underlying intentions of 
Congress when it enacted, modified, and retained section 104(a)(2).  The 
evidence presented shows that Congress intended to help those who 
suffered physical injuries and that Congress expressly did not intend the 
exclusion to apply to those who suffered purely emotional distress injuries.  
This proposal maintains that intention because it allows those who suffer 
physical manifestations of emotional distress to enjoy the benefits of the 
section 104(a)(2) exclusion while still maintaining the prohibition of the 
exclusion for those who suffer purely emotional distress injuries. 
 
 157 See Leeper, supra note 16, at 1068. 
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CONCLUSION 
This comment has examined the lack of uniformity with which section 
104(a)(2) is applied to similarly situated taxpayers.  The argument centered 
around the fact that those who suffer real, verifiable physical 
manifestations of emotional distress do not receive the same tax treatment 
as those who suffer purely physical injuries.  If section 104(a)(2) was 
intended to alleviate the tax burden for those who suffer physical injuries, 
then it should not matter whether the physical injury took place 
immediately after the tort or later in time.  As long as an affirmative causal 
link is established between the initial emotional distress injury and the 
subsequent physical manifestations, then the section 104(a)(2) exclusion 
should apply. 
The background and history of section 104(a)(2) show that it has 
experienced a rather tumultuous existence.  This turbulent existence 
became more evident through an analysis of the case decisions that have 
shaped the modern understanding of section 104(a)(2).  Evidence was 
presented to demonstrate that there are solid legal, medical, prudential, and 
ethical grounds to show that section 104(a)(2) does indeed treat similarly 
situated taxpayers differently.  A simple proposal was offered—allowing 
application of section 104(a)(2) to those who have physical manifestations 
proximately caused by emotional distress—in order to make section 
104(a)(2) more equitable and uniform in application.  Allowing someone 
who suffers legitimate physical manifestations of emotional distress to 
receive the same tax treatment as someone who suffers purely physical 
injuries will reinforce the notion that the tax code is founded on basic 
notions of fairness and uniformity. 
